INTRODUCTION
Many historic civil engineering structures in eastern Japan were seriously damaged by the Tohoku Region Pacific Coast Earthquake and the resulting tsunami on March 11, 2011. On May 23, 2011, a Special Subcommittee on the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake (hereafter the Subcommittee) was established within the Japan Society of Civil Engineers' Committee on Historical Studies in Civil Engineering, and a survey on the damage situation of historic civil engineering structures was conducted in cooperation with institutions such as the Architectural Institute of Japan and the Agency for Cultural Affairs, as well as branch offices of the Japan Society of Civil Engineers (JSCE), and the Nomination Committee for JSCE's Recommended Civil Engineering Heritage (hereafter the Nomination Com-mittee), among others. This paper first discusses the system and methods for surveying the damage to historic civil engineering structures in the event of large-scale natural disasters such as earthquakes, based on the experience in the Tohoku Region Pacific Coast Earthquake. Also, this paper presents the findings on the conservation of historic civil engineering structures in the event of a disaster, keeping in mind important considerations relating to disaster prevention and disaster recovery of civil engineering structures.
In the case of the Great Tohoku Earthquake, the authors of this paper played a leading role from the consultation and construction of the system of the survey on the damage situation of historic civil engineering structures, which led to the establishment of the Subcommittee, to the planning and conduct of the survey. Above all, the authors, as the chairman, the secretary or the advisor of the Subcommittee, played a key role in discussing the survey method, and in planning and conducting the actual site surveys. It can be said that the authors are uniquely qualified to grasp and summarize the entire survey process. That is, considerations of the stages of the survey processes, such as construction of the survey system, establishment of the survey methods, and implementation of the survey, would be the results of the authors' original undertaking.
In addition, based on the individual observations from the survey submitted by the Subcommittee members including us, the authors synthesized the damage status of each historic civil engineering structure suffered from the Great Tohoku Earthquake. Moreover, based on the observations, the authors discussed disaster factors, challenges and proposals for future full-scale restoration work. That is to say, such results would also be, originally, the authors'.
First, in this paper, the progress of activities and history of the establishment of the Subcommittee are organized in Chapter 2. Next, the research methods of the survey by the Subcommittee are organized in Chapter 3. The results of the primary survey are summarized in Chapter 4, and the results of the secondary survey in Chapter 5. Based on those results, Chapter 6 presents the findings on the conservation of historic civil engineering structures in the event of a disaster.
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SUBCOM-MITTEE (1) History of establishment
To date, the Committee on Historical Studies in Civil Engineering has not sufficiently accumulated knowledge on methodical research in the event of large-scale natural disasters such as earthquakes. Therefore, immediately after the earthquake, discus- Table 1 Process leading to the establishment of the Special Subcommittee on the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake.
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Date
Main Activities
th April 2011

Board meeting of the Committee on Historical Studies in Civil Engineering
An emergency board meeting was held to discuss what actions the Committee on Historical Studies in Civil Engineering has to take in relation to the Great East Japan Earthquake. !As a kick-off action, research papers on disaster and restoration from past historical studies on civil engineering were chosen and the list was posted on the committee's homepage. !As for middle-to long-term activities, there were continuous consultation in the board meetings while keeping an eye on the restoration and reconstruction progress. !At the conference on historical studies in civil engineering in June, a discussion program on the Great East Japan Earthquake was planned and carried out. Middle-to long-term activities were also discussed. 
Renewed the list of essays on disaster and reconstruction
The list of the essays on disaster and reconstruction on the committee's web site was renewed. 19 th May 2011"
Deliberation about the establishment of a Special Subcommittee on the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake
Started deliberations about establishing a special subcommittee on the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake by circulating e-mail among the members of the committee. 23
rd May 2011
Approval of the establishment of the Special Subcommittee on the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake
The Special Subcommittee on the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake was approved through e-mail discussions among committee members. sions about research methods and the research framework were held during meetings of the Committee on Historical Studies in Civil Engineering and its executive members, taking into account consultations with the Secretariat of the Japan Society of Civil Engineers and the Agency for Cultural Affairs. As a result of the consultations, a Subcommittee (Special Subcommittee on the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake) was to be established within the Committee on Historical Studies in Civil Engineering to conduct surveys. This Subcommittee was established on May 23, 2011.
The background on the establishment of the Subcommittee is shown in Table 1 together with the related activities of the Committee on Historical Studies in Civil Engineering.
(2) The purposes of the establishment
Based on discussions in the Committee on Historical Studies in Civil Engineering and among the executive members, the following were stated as the purposes for the establishment of the Subcommittee:
• To understand the damage situation of the historic (3) The makeup of the committee Upon establishment of the Subcommittee, the appointment of the committee members was made from the following perspectives:
• The committee to be convened by experts and researchers from various fields, as it was assumed that the potentially damaged historic civil engineering structures could span a wide range of fields.
• The committee to call practitioners well-versed in the field of practice, as the main activities of the Subcommittee required survey and there was a possibility that some in-service historic civil engineering structures had been affected.
• The Subcommittee was to play the role of the brain, to work out a strategy of investigation, and to reinforce the investigation committees on the implementation of the actual survey in response to the study. Therefore, the committee was to put importance on the mobility of meetings and conferences, and the members of the Subcommittee were to be convened mainly from Tokyo-based professionals and researchers. As a result, the Subcommittee consisted of Tokyobased practitioners in each discipline, as shown in Table 2 ; among the professionals and researchers involved in the Committee on Historical Studies in Civil Engineering were those from the fields of structures, bridges, foundations, coast, harbors, railways, landscape, civil engineering heritage and cultural properties. • The committee to be convened by experts and ds, as it was assumed that the potentially damaged historic civil engineering ioners well-versed in the main activities of the Subcommittee required survey and there was a possibility that some in-service historic civil engineering the role of the brain, to reinforce the the implementation of the actual survey in response to the study. Therefore, the ce on the mobility of and the members of the Subcommittee were to be convened mainly from As a result, the Subcommittee consisted of Tokyo-based practitioners in each discipline, as shown in Table 2 ; among the professionals and researchers involved in the in Civil Engineering were those from the fields of structures, bridges, foundations, ndscape, civil engineering 
THE SURVEY METHOD (1) Examination of research methods
At the time of the establishment of the Subcommittee (May 23, 2011), the Committee on Historical Studies in Civil Engineering did not have accu-rate information about the existence of damage on historic civil engineering structures. Under these circumstances, the survey methods for investigating the damage situation were discussed in the Subcommittee while at the same time exchanging information with the Agency for Cultural Affairs.
The investigation into survey methods considered the following points in particular:
• The region affected by the Tohoku Earthquake was quite extensive-covering not only the East Pacific Ocean coast but also extending inland-and it was assumed that a wide range of civil engineering structures across the fields had been affected. In addition, there were single yet large-scale civil engineering structures, ones with long extension or whose composing elements spread out to large areas. Therefore, a large-scale and fully comprehensive survey on historic civil engineering structures was unrealistic as it was difficult to gather enough researchers at once.
• The administrators and owners of the historic civil engineering structures (hereafter administrators, etc.) were mainly national and local governments, and their cooperation was necessary for the investigation of in-service facilities. However, the national and local governments had been busy trying to recover the infrastructure, and particular care needed to be taken so as not to put any further burden on the administrators, etc. with this survey. Keeping these points in mind, as a result of the considerations, the survey was to be conducted according to the following policies:
• The subjects of this study would be historic civil engineering structures situated where heavy damage was caused by the earthquake and tsunami, not only in Hokkaido and the Tohoku region, but also in areas in the Kanto region such as Ibaraki, Tochigi, Gunma, Saitama and Chiba where damage was suspected and even as far as Nagano Prefecture.
• This study would be limited to those objects whose value had been recognized to a certain degree as "Important Cultural Properties (Structure)," "Registered Tangible Cultural Properties (Structure)," or "Civil Engineering Heritage Recommended by the JSCE (hereafter JSCE's Recommended Civil Engineering Heritage)," rather than being a thorough and comprehensive study. However, in the case of a civil engineering structure with a certain historical value, which had not been subject to the survey originally, it would be included as a subject of the survey, if, during the process, damage was confirmed.
• This study was to be carried out in two stages: the primary and the secondary surveys.
• The primary survey to verify the existence or not of damage would be carried out by telephone, e-mail or written forms to the administrators, etc.
• The secondary survey would consist of site surveys by members of the Subcommittee and others to observe the damage status.
• Based on the results of the primary survey, the Subcommittee examined the priorities of the secondary survey, and started investigating in order of priority. The research subjects of the secondary survey would be chosen from the following: -Facilities that were reported in the primary survey to have been damaged. -Among the facilities reported undamaged in the primary survey, some investigation (where damage was suspected) might still need to be done after referring to an earthquake intensity distribution map of the location. -Facilities where the administrator concerned or the local Board of Education was not able to confirm the damage status.
(2) Establishing the research subject and methods a) Research methods and subjects of the primary survey The subjects of the primary survey were the "Important Cultural Properties (Structure)," "Registered Tangible Cultural Properties (Structure)," and the "JSCE's Recommended Civil Engineering Heritage" in Hokkaido and the Tohoku regions, in addition to those areas in the Kanto region where the scale of damage was suspected of being great such as Ibaraki, Tochigi, Gunma, Saitama, Chiba, and further afield, Nagano Prefecture.
As regards the "Important Cultural Properties (Structure)" and "Registered Tangible Cultural Properties (Structure)," the Agency for Cultural Affairs, in accordance with the provisions of the Law for the Protection of Cultural Properties, was to check the damage through the Boards of Education of all levels from town, village and municipality to prefecture.
On the other hand, the damage to the "JSCE's Recommended Civil Engineering Heritage" was to be checked through each branch office of the Society of Civil Engineers (Hokkaido, Tohoku, Kanto, and Chubu) in conjunction with the Nomination Committee. To implement the survey, either the branch officer in charge would make inquiries to the owner or administrator by telephone, e-mail or in writing, or the person in charge would go to the site to conduct visual inspection.
A questionnaire from the Subcommittee on JSCE's Recommended Civil Engineering Heritage was to be issued to the person in charge at each branch office of the JSCE through the Nomination Committee. After filling in the survey results, the questionnaire would be returned through the Nomination Committee again to the Subcommittee. Also, the questions were mainly in multiple-choice format as shown in Table 4 , taking into account the burden of answering on the administrators, etc. The number of historic civil engineering structures in the primary survey is shown in Table 5 and Table  6 . The historic civil engineering structures that became research subjects as "Registered Tangible Cultural Properties (Structure)" and in the category of "Important Cultural Property (Structure)" were selected from those that met certain criteria: the ones related to transportation · civil engineering in the category of "modern/industrial · transportation · civil engineering" of the "Important Cultural Property (Structure)"; further, from the types of "Registered Tangible   Table 7 Survey items for the secondary survey. 
Survey items Contents Damage status and factors
Damage status understood from interviewing the administrator and visual observation, and impressions on conceivable damage factors.
Emergency restoration status
Progress of restoration and repair work at the time of site survey, and observations on restoration or repair work.
Challenges and proposals for the full restoration
Challenges for the restoration and repairs thereafter, and observations on conceivable restoration or repairing methods.
Others
Other remarkable points. Based on this survey, as a member of the Committee on Historical Studies in Civil Engineering, what to research, study, suggest to administrators, information or problems at the actual site survey, or any useful opinions for improving the committee's activities.
Photos
Part name, location category of damage memo
Cultural Properties (Structure)," those selected fell under the category of "civil engineering structures." b) Research methods and subjects of the second survey The secondary survey was to be based on the results of the primary survey, and site surveys would be conducted in order of priority of the damage status. In addition, upon implementation, based on the field and status of the survey subject facilities, as well as other factors of estimated damage, other experts in various fields would be added as necessary to the investigation system, along with the Subcommittee. The survey is a check survey by visual observation of the damage status by researchers, as well as interviews with the administrators and owners about the damage, emergency restoration works immediately after the disaster and their progress, and the contents of the full restoration works, progress and future policies.
The results of these investigations were put together on the survey sheet by each respective researcher, and submitted to the Subcommittee. The contents described in the survey sheet are shown in Table 7 .
RESULTS OF THE PRIMARY SURVEY
(1) Results related to the important cultural properties (structure) Results of the primary survey suggested that, as regards the Important Cultural Properties (Structure), the four facilities described in Table 8 had been damaged by the disaster. Among these, with regard to the First Ishioka Hydroelectric Power Plant facilities, the water reservoir was seriously damaged due to the collapse of the slope, and the damaged reservoir was deleted from being designated as an Important Cultural Property (Structure) on 15th July 2011.
(2) Results related to the registered tangible cultural properties (structure) As a result of the primary survey, the six facilities in Table 9 that were Registered Tangible Cultural Properties (Structure) were found to be damaged. Table 10 were found to be damaged.
RESULTS OF THE SECOND SURVEY
(1) Selection of the research subject facilities and establishing the investigation system Based on the results of the primary survey, discussion based on the previously discussed viewpoints was carried out in the Subcommittee, and as subject facilities for the second survey, the following were chosen: the Nobiru Harbor and Related Facilities (JSCE's Recommended Civil Engineering Heritage) and Ishii Lock (Important Cultural Property (Structure), which had been seriously damaged by the tsunami; Lake Kasumigaura bank facilities (JSCE's Recommended Civil Engineering Heritage) and the Yokotone Lock (Important Cultural Property (Struc- Crack was seen on the back of the small step of the right bank ture)), which were damaged by liquefaction; the R. Kitakami diversion facilities (JSCE's Recommended Civil Engineering Heritage), and the Water Reservoir of the First Ishioka Hydroelectric Power Plant (Important Cultural Property (Structure)), which was destroyed by a slope landslide caused by the earthquake.
On establishing the investigation system for the second survey, cooperation from other experts and researchers of various fields related to the Committee on Historical Studies in Civil Engineering was sought to establish the investigation system together with the Subcommittee, considering the type of subject facilities, the damage status and the possible factors of the disaster.
The subject facilities and investigation system for the secondary survey are shown in Table 11 .
(2) Compilation of survey results
Based on individual observations from the survey submitted by each respective researcher, the authors first summarized the results of the secondary survey for each survey subject facility: a) the damage status and disaster factors, and b) the status of emergency restoration work. On top of those, the authors summarized the following as necessary for future restoration work: c) challenges and proposals for future full-scale restoration work, and d) other things to be considered.
(3) Survey results for the Ishii Lock
The Ishii Lock was built based on plans by Dutch engineer Cornelis Johannes van Doorn. Construction started in 1878 (Meiji 11th), and was completed in Table 11 Subject facilities of the second survey and research organization. The subject facilities and investigation system for the 
(Meiji 13th
). It consists of the stone lock chamber, the brick lock head that stores the gate doors and is situated in the former R. Kitakami side of the lock chamber, and the lock tail that connects the Kitakami canal side of the lock chamber. The Ishii Lock is highly valuable in civil engineering history, and represents what remains of the Nobiru Harbor and Related Facilities promoted by the Meiji government. It is also a pioneering figure of lock modernization in our country, and an indication of the standard of modern locks built across the country from the Meiji period throughout the Taisho period. 1) 
a) Damage status and disaster factors
First, according to the administrators, a drive unit of the lock gate was damaged because the tsunami ran up the Kitakami Canal to the former R. Kitakami through the Ishii Lock. The gates were open at both the lock head and lock tail at the time of the disaster, but they had been manually closed at the time of the site survey. In addition, the overall surrounding area had subsided by about 60cm after the earthquake.
At the time of the survey, major damage was not found in the brick body of the lock head and lock tail parts. Neither did the stone wall of the lock chamber show any great damage (Photo 1). Although some irregularities were found in the stone wall of the lock chamber, the protrusion was not great, which suggested that the seismic motion was not so large and that the land subsidence affected the stone wall. Cracks and disarrangement were seen in the stone wall and stairs of both rear and front locks (Photo 2), but ground subsidence made the entire structure sink and it is presumed that the concentrated strain caused them.
However, by comparison with secular change data, it must be identified in the future whether they were affected by the earthquake or not. Although these cracks are supposed to have occurred with the opening up of part of the stone wall and masonry joints between the brick and coping stones, in the future it has to be confirmed whether the opening reached the inner part of the body. Also, peeling was seen on some corner and coping stones (Photo 3), but it can be determined that this did not reduce the strength of the body.
On the other hand, part of the drive unit was severely damaged though it is understood that the gate came under pressure from the tsunami and the effects appeared in the drive unit. However, as no great change in the shape of the gate was seen, it was assumed that the pressure did not exceed the safety limit of the gates. In addition, as there was little damage on the gate surface (Photo 4), there seemed to have been no drift or collision of heavy objects.
Although the damage status of the lock gate floor and scouring of the base was not covered in this study, the damage of the bottom part has to be confirmed in the future.
b) Status of the emergency restoration work
At the time of the site survey, the gate had been closed manually due to damage to the drive unit of the gate. For other parts, a full-scale investigation, overhaul and restoration had not been implemented.
On the visual observation level, there was little need for emergency repairs or reinforcement as major damage was not found, and more important than emergency repairs was that a detailed study of damage status and monitoring of the progress of the cracks caused by aftershocks should be implemented.
As for the right embankment near the lock head, emergency repairs of damaged places had been undertaken with sandbags. c) Challenges and proposals for full-scale restoration works Regarding the full-scale restoration and repairs, the following six items were necessary investigation and check points in terms of the structural aspects:
• Investigation of land subsidence around the site.
• Measurement of stone wall distortion.
• Understanding the state of the cracks in the brick body.
• Checking the status of water infiltration from the back of the lock gates.
• Diagnosis of the stone and brick material deterioration.
• Checking the existence of damage on the floor of the lock chamber and scouring the bottom of the base. At first, for these surveys and considerations it was necessary to measure the current situation. In addition to that, the overall changes in the shape of the lock, and the degree of subsidence of the surrounding ground needed to be understood by making comparisons with drawings from before the disaster. Then, careful investigation must be conducted of the damaged portion of the stone walls and brick body.
If possible, it would be desirable to drain the water in the lock gate to fully understand the status of damage around the floor. It is also important to specify whether the damaged part was due to this earthquake disaster or not, based on the comparison of data from before the disaster, or at least organize these survey data chronologically and by each spatial region.
Furthermore, careful consideration from a comprehensive and cross-sectional viewpoint would be necessary at the time of full-scale restoration and repairs. Examination from various aspects would be necessary: not only structural engineering, but also hydraulics, geotechnical engineering, earthquake engineering, tsunami engineering, cultural heritage, and civil engineering history. In particular, concerning the local community, it would be ideal to link regional planning and regional disaster prevention planning, etc.
On the other hand, the concern was that if the upper part of the lock's door became lower than the planned high water level because of ground subsidence, either the attachment of an additional facility to the lock's door or the replacement of the lock's door itself would be necessary to maintain the function of flood control.
d) Other considerations
Even in the case of restoring the lock being carried out or the needed replacement of the facility of the lock gate in terms of water management, it is necessary to carry out a careful and thorough examination on how to save the current body.
In addition, as the mechanical parts were set up in later years, they did not have cultural property value, but the Ishii Lock is known as 'the oldest working lock' in civil engineering heritage, and it is important to consider carefully whether to preserve the mechanical parts in a mobile state for the future.
(4) Survey results for the former Nobiru Harbor site Nobiru Harbor was Japan's first Western-style modern harbor, planned by the Meiji government and built based on the recommendations of the Dutch engineer van Doorn. In addition, connected to Nobiru Harbor, the Kitakami, Touna, and Teizan Canals were built, and together they form a group recognized as the largest canal network in the country with a total length of about 46km connecting the R. Abukuma and R. Kitakami.
The results of the survey on the former Nobiru Harbor and Related Facilities are as follows: a) Damage status and disaster factors
The following types of damage were confirmed at each facility in the former Nobiru Harbor site.
• The brick abutments of the R. Shin-Naruse
• The abutments of the Nakanohashi Bridge in the brick abutments of the R. Shin-Naruse were sub-e lock being carried out cility of the lock gate in necessary to carry out a n on how to save the arts were set up in later property value, but the t working lock' in civil important to consider mechanical parts in a the former Nobiru
Photo 5 Damaged abutments of Shimonohashi bridge base on the R. Shin merged, and it was not possible to confirm the submergence position. According to the Board of Education and others, a diving investigation was undertaken, but it was not concluded successfully as the abutments were already covered with mud.
• The downstream two out of three abutments on the left bank of Shimonohashi Bridge were washed away, and the remaining one was missing its upper part (Photo 5).
• All three of the abutments on the right bank of the Shimonohashi Bridge remained but the characteristic decorations in the upper coping stone, the "decorative saw-shaped brick work" part was missing.
• Whether this damage was from the earthquake or the tsunami was not evident, but the surrounding land seemed to have subsided due to the earthquake, and it was presumed that the damage came from the earthquake and the tsunami, which hit after the seismic motion.
• Protected Objects
• The monument of Keitoku Kurosawa, rollers for leveling the harbor, sign poles, and other things kept in the central part of the former harbor site, as well as the brick structure of the weather service building, were moved or toppled by the tsunami (Photo 6).
• The Kitakami Canal
• The pine forest on the seawall on the sea side of the Kitakami canal was partly washed away; moreover, the seawall itself had been scoured on a large scale (Photo 7).
• The East Jetty and the West Jetty
• The abutments of the Nakanohashi Bridge in the brick -Naruse were submerged, and it was not possible to confirm the submergence position. According to the Board of Education and others, a diving investigation was undertaken, but it was not concluded successfully as the abutments were three abutments on the left bank of Shimonohashi Bridge were washed away, and the remaining one was missing its upper part (Photo • Defects were found, presumed to be due to the tsunami.
• The monument to the JSCE's Recommended Civil Engineering Heritage • Only the monument's base remained while the monument itself lay toppled in the vicinity.
b) Status of emergency restoration work
Regarding the protected objects, each facility that had been moved from the central part of the site has been returned to the center but left in a toppled position (Photo 6).
Others were left the way they were. c) Challenges and proposals for full-scale restoration works • The brick abutments of the R. Shin-Naruse
• It is a great loss that the decorative part of the coping stone that had been one of the characteristic features of the brick abutment is now gone, but it is necessary to preserve the old structure as much as possible by salvaging the damaged parts, which are assumed to be submerged under water.
• In addition, it is possible that the coping stone parts might have drifted away over an extensive area, as a portion that was assumed to be a part of the decorative coping stone of the abutment was found on the ground on the site. The decorative parts that were found should be investigated by the size of brick, texture, and stamped mark, to verify whether they matched the abutment or not.
• The missing or collapsed pieces of the abutment still need to be investigated; however, as the upper structure and other main parts had already been lost before the disaster, it is thought that by preserving the existing remains, their value as civil engineering heritage would still be valid. Partly to hand down the remains from the earthquake disaster to future generations, it would be best to preserve the status quo and avoid hasty restoration work.
• It is important to keep specific records of which parts of the abutment were lost this time because of the earthquake, and match them with existing past research data, and it would be desirable to investigate those facts.
• Furthermore, it would be important to fully under-r full-scale restoration rative part of the coping characteristic features of ne, but it is necessary to much as possible by hich are assumed to be t the coping stone parts an extensive area, as a e a part of the decorative as found on the ground stand the structure of the base of the abutment at the time of the restoration works.
• Protected Objects
• Most of the objects have been secured, but it is necessary to check if there are other reserves that may have been washed away.
d) Other considerations
Due to the scouring by the tsunami, new remains like a culvert of the sewer system were discovered in the former Nobiru Harbor site, and taking the earthquake disaster as an opportunity, some unknown facts from before the earthquake disaster were discovered. Taking this into account, with the restoration work, it is desirable to compare and study the current status and old situation throughout the former Nobiru Harbor site. Though the canal route of the Teizan Canal was retained, both sides of the embankment were lost (Photo 8). The stone walls were practically in the same condition and position as they were, and although some defects were seen in the bank's stone retaining wall (Photo 9), there was no damage such as from being washed away by the tsunami, so it was assumed that they slid and were transformed by seismic motion and subsidence. Much of the pine grove along the canal was damaged by the tsunami. Some were broken at the base and fell down, and others were broken in the middle of the trunk or a large branch. On the other hand, the condition of the remaining trees that survived the tsunami was generally good. ii) Tagajo City
The Teizan Canal within Tagajo City was practically unchanged although damage was seen in some places in the banks (Photo 10). The same kind of damage as seen in the Wakabayashi area of Sendai City could be seen in the stone walls at the sandbank where the Teizan Canal bifurcates (Photo 11). On the other hand, major damage was not found in the green area of mixed conifer and broadleaf trees on the sandbank, although it must have been hit by the tsunami as it rushed upstream.
b) Status of emergency restoration work
The canal facilities and Teizan Canal itself had been left almost untouched in their damaged state although some parts of the banks were protected by sandbags and temporary roads were constructed along the route. c) Challenges and proposals for the full-scale restoration works Though the Teizan Canal route has been maintained, the damaged canal facilities need to be repaired. The restoration of the pine grove along the route is, in terms of disaster prevention as well, particularly desirable if at all possible.
On the other hand, the collapse of the stone walls is assumed to be due to the subsidence of all the stone walls along with the area surrounding the canal, and therefore due to the subsidence of a large region, restoration work is thought to be difficult. For the time being, partial restoration work is more realistic, for instance, repairing some parts of the stone walls that were badly deformed.
Also in this study, we did not get a complete picture of the damage in the whole of the Teizan Canal, thus the identification of submerged areas by subsidence and the transformation of topography are needed, for instance, by comparing aerial photos of the area before and after the disaster.
d) Other considerations
The restoration work needs to be backed up by well-substantiated background research and carried out as required for a cultural property. At the same time, it is important that restoration planning be undertaken for the whole canal area and not only by each administrative division in its own area.
Also, there is a need to discuss the strengthening of disaster prevention functions. It is likewise desirable to accommodate their values, both as a cultural property and as a disaster prevention facility.
(6) Survey results for the R. Kitakami Diversion facilities The R. Kitakami Diversion facilities were built in the first phase of the R. Kitakami improvements, the pre-WWII large-scale project of building diversion facilities. They have a rare collection of gates that were chosen in the dawning of diversion weir construction in this country. 2) We conducted a survey of the R. Kitakami Diversion facilities, in the tsunami stricken areas around the estuary of R. Kitakami on the First Tsukihama water gates, the Second Tsukihama water gates, the Kamaya water gates, and the Fukuchi water gates. The survey results are as follows: a) Damage status and disaster factors i) The First Tsukihama water gates One of the former First Tsukihama water gates had been moved from its original position to near the second Tsukihama water gates upon the installation of new water gates in 2006 (Heisei 18th). This relocated former water gate was moved from its original position. Though damage was seen on the upper part of the structure, the original shape was mostly retained.
It is likely that the tsunami caused this damage. ii) The second Tsukihama water gates Though the appearance of the main part of the water gates was retained, damage was seen in each of the parts (Photo 12). In particular, the steel wire rope winch that pulled up the balance gates was lost (Photo 13). The side embankment on the gates' right bank was lost as well.
It is likely that the tsunami caused this damage. iii) Kamaya water gates (Photo 14)
The right embankment of the R. Kitakami around the Kamaya water gates disappeared, and the whole area around the dike had been submerged. The Kamaya water gates were also submerged, and only a part of the balance gate could be seen above the water surface, but it had no trace of its original shape (Photo 15).
iv) Fukuchi water gates
No damage was seen on a visual observation level.
b) Status of emergency restoration work i) The First Tsukihama water gates
These were left untouched from the original dam-aged condition.
ii) The Second Tsukihama water gates The main body of the water gates themselves was left untouched from the original damaged condition. The missing part of the side embankment on the right side of the water gates was temporarily repaired with sandbags (Photo 12). iii) Kamaya water gates No restoration work had been done including the surrounding area. iv) Fukuchi water gates As no damage was seen, no restoration or repair works were undertaken. c) Challenges and proposals for the full-scale restoration works i) The First Tsukihama water gates
To continuously retain and preserve them in the original position, the damaged parts should be restored to their original shape.
There is sense in transferring and preserving even one gate, but the concrete post that supports the gates bears no semblance to its original form, and it would be recommendable to install a signboard that explains the way things used to be in its working days.
ii) The Second Tsukihama water gates
There is a need to consider whether the gates can retain their function in relation to the planned dyke; however, restoration as a working facility is desired henceforth. Even if they lose their function as water gates, the best possible conservation would be to keep them in their original position.
As for the lost winch, even if no repairs are carried out, it is recommended that explanatory signboards with photographs and the like are installed. iii) Kamaya water gates As for the full-scale restoration work, a large-scale project to restore the gates and the river facilities around the area are needed. If it is too difficult to restore the function of the gate's main body, it is desirable to at least preserve the water gates, even partially, in their current position. iv) Fukuchi water gates Although it is not damage caused by the tsunami, dilapidation caused by rust is widely seen on the back of the central doors, thus maintenance work including painting is desired.
(7) Survey results for the Yokotone Lock
The Yokotone Lock is one of the most significant civil engineering structures in the R. Tone improvement project run directly by the Department of the Interior, and was completed in March 1921 (Taisho 21 st ). It contributed to flood control along the Kasumigaura coastal area, the development of river and water transportation in the R. Tone basin, and in boosting the local economy. As one of the largest brick locks with a double locking system in this country, the remains are important in civil engineering history as they show a prime example of brick built locks. 3) Surveys on the Yokotone Lock were conducted on the main lock body as well as on Yoshizo Nakagawa's bust area that was also classified as a cultural property. The results are as follows: a) Damage status and disaster factors i) Yokotone Lock
Damage from liquefaction was seen on the banks around the lock, but the main body of the lock gates was generally undamaged in both the lock head and lock chamber, and it operated normally with boats passing through (Photo 16). However, this survey found damage in two places.
First, a crack was found in the side wall of the left bank framework that contains the gears to open and close the small door of the lock head on the R. Yokotone side (upstream) (Photo 17). According to the administrator, the width of the crack was broader than at the time of the previous survey immediately after the main earthquake on March 11th. This survey confirmed that this crack was serious as it ran from dressing brick to reinforced concrete; moreover it reached the stone wall on the bank side (Photo 18). Also, the crack ran from the opening of the machine room, which contained the gear mechanism to the base of the reinforced concrete, but its condition under water could not be grasped, and so it is unknown whether the crack reached the base.
This crack is assumed to have occurred and developed in the following manner:
• Because the foundation ground of the upper stream left bank side of the lock was a former river bed, liquefaction caused by the seismic motion occurred in the thickly accumulated soft sand layer.
• Subsidence gradually increased due to the disappearance of the excess pore water pressure caused by the liquefaction.
• Land subsidence caused sloping and subsidence of the lock head body on the upper stream left bank side, and a crack appeared around the machine room area, the weak point of the body structure.
• The crack developed as subsidence progressed with the aftershocks. On the other hand, irregularities were found in the stone wall of the lock head on the left bank (upper stream side) R. Yokotone side (Photo 19). As for this factor, it is presumed to have been, like the crack, caused by the liquefaction of the foundation ground. ii) Yoshizo Nakagawa's bust site
The Yoshizo Nakagawa's bust site placed on the right embankment of the R. Tone was damaged by inclination and subsidence due to liquefaction of the foundation ground as well as earthquake-caused collapse of the slope of the embankment (Photo 20). b) Status of emergency restoration work i) Yokotone Lock
As the seriousness of the crack on the side wall of the lock head was first revealed by this survey, neither restoration nor repair work was to be seen at the time of the site survey.
On the other hand, as for the irregularities in the stone wall on the left bank, the stone wall had been re-laid and patched up by concrete. ii) Yoshizo Nakagawa's bust site At the time of the survey, to stabilize the soil prior to restoration work, the bust site was temporarily dismantled and removed, and the bust and each part that made up the site have been stored in a warehouse nearby. According to the administrators, at the time of the removal, many concrete stakes that had been driven into the base of the bust site were identified (Photo 21).
Furthermore, at the time of survey, the site foundations were being cured with the objective of restoring the bust site. c) Challenges and proposals for the full-scale restoration works i) Yokotone Lock Prior to the full restoration work, the inclination and subsidence of the lock head as well as the length, width and depth of the crack on the sidewall need to be monitored over a fixed period of time by automatic measuring. As the width of the crack may possibly have been gradually widening since immediately after the main earthquake on March 11th, it is important to precisely measure daily changes and changes after any further aftershocks.
Also, it would be desirable to check the depth of the crack under water by a submersible survey, and ideally take the gear mechanism, etc., out of the machine room temporarily to investigate the cracks inside with a miniature camera.
If no inclination, subsidence of the body or progress in the crack was detected as a result of monitoring, some emergency treatments could be considered, such as filling in the crack with epoxy resin, taking out the dressing bricks temporarily and then re-laying the dressing bricks after repairing the cracks.
On the other hand, if inclination, subsidence of the body or progress in the crack were detected, the progress needs to be stopped by such treatments as pouring cement into the foundation ground for stabilization. ii) Yoshizo Nakagawa's bust site Despite the fact that the bust site was built on a base into which numerous concrete stakes were driven, it was seriously damaged by liquefaction. Therefore, at the time of full restoration work, it is desirable to take sufficient measures, keeping the pile foundation in mind.
d) Other considerations
As described before, at the time of the site survey, the Yoshizo Nakagawa's bust site was temporarily removed due to ground stabilization work prior to full restoration, and that upon its removal, numerous concrete stakes were identified at the base of the bust site (Photo 21). Installing the bust on the embankment is presumed to have been a kind of ground improvement work at the time of construction.
According to the administrators, prior to the removal, drawings were made of each part that made up the bust above ground and its site assuming that restoration would be carried out. However, because the concrete stakes at the base were attached to the concrete floor of the bust site, they were destroyed when the bust was transferred to the storage warehouse and no detailed record was taken, such as the number of stakes, position and sizes. If the size, quantity and positions of the concrete stakes had been recorded, some assumptions regarding construction time on ground stabilization could have been made.
Taking these situations into account, even in the case of the unavoidable removal of such a historic civil engineering structure, the importance of keeping records of the structure to be removed, pictures, drawings, the number of parts, and characteristics of materials can be pointed out.
(8) Survey results for Lake Kasumigaura bank facilities The Lake Kasumigaura bank facilities were completed as the former Kashima Air Force base's facilities in 1937 (Showa 12 th ). There are complete plans for the crew aerial warfare training and the facilities in existence and it also has important and unique historic value in our country's aerial warfare history from pre-war to war time. 4) Even at present, 70 years after its completion, the Lake Kasumigaura bank facilities Photo 22 The Lake Kasumigaura bank facilities before disaster (Photo:
Photo 22
The Lake Kasumigaura bank facilities before disaster (Photo: Lake Kasumigaura River Office, Kanto Regional Development Bureau, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism) (retouched photo)
Photo 23 Damage status of the Lake Kasumigaura bank facilities (Photo:
Photo 23 Damage status of the Lake Kasumigaura bank facilities (Photo: Abe, 4 th Nov. 2011) function as a flood control facility preventing scouring by waves, suggesting a high level of civil engineering techniques at that time.
The results of the survey on the Kasumigaura lakeside facilities are as follows: a) Damage status and disaster factors Mainly the concrete slopes at the west side of the south sliding way and north side of the east sliding way (Photo 22) had caved in or rolled up (Photo 23). This damage is presumed to have been caused by the liquefaction of the foundation ground and the consequent flow into the lake.
On the other hand, even on the same sliding way, no damage was recognized on the concrete slopes of the east side of the south sliding way or south side of the east sliding way. Such a presence and absence of damage might be attributable to previous repair work or disaster recovery construction. However, as references to such could not be obtained, contributing factors could not be identified.
Also, no damage was seen in the remains of the first, second or third command posts, remains of the pier, catapult, or stone retaining walls of the bank from the remains of the catapult to the east sliding way.
b) Status of emergency restoration work
At the time of the site survey, the damaged concrete slopes were temporarily repaired with sandbags on the base and level differences. Also, access to the damaged places was prohibited and their use was restricted. c) Challenges and proposals for the full-scale restoration works According to the administrators, at the time of the full restoration works the existing damaged concrete slopes are to be removed and new concrete slopes will be laid. The existing concrete slope is a 20cm-thick shingle concrete; however, the new concrete slope will have a total thickness of 20cm, where the bottom 15cm is ordinary concrete and only the 5cm-thick upper layer will be shingle concrete maintaining the existing design of the concrete slope. The new concrete slope will be reinforced by metal mesh inside, which is not used in the existing concrete slope but which will strengthen it.
After these restoration works are completed and the existing damaged concrete slopes are removed, the value of the Lake Kasumigaura bank facilities will be greatly lost as civil engineering heritage. Therefore, upon removal, it is recommended that the base of the slope and treatment methods of the top part, and characteristics of the shingle concrete materials should be recorded as much as possible. On the other hand, as regards the undamaged parts, appropriate measures should be taken, and they should be continuously conserved for the future.
This time, the restoration work is limited to the concrete slopes without any ground improvement works. However, re-liquefaction from aftershocks is a concern in the damaged places, and treatment such as stabilization of the foundation ground is desirable.
d) Other considerations
As pointed out before, the value of the Lake Kasumigaura bank facilities as civil engineering heritage would be greatly lost by the removal of the damaged existing concrete slopes. In cases like this, taking into account previous examples of the delisting of important cultural properties (structure) or registered tangible cultural properties (structure), how to respond to situations similar to JSCE's Recommended Civil Engineering Heritage in the future must be considered.
In the same way, methods and thoughts on the restoration and record keeping need to be considered hereafter.
(9) Survey results for the water reservoir of the First Ishioka Hydroelectric Power Plant The First Ishioka Hydroelectric Power Plant facility is a conduit-type power plant built to serve the increasing demands for electric power from the Hitachi copper mine. It was completed in 1911 (Meiji 44 th ). Known as one of the most significant facilities of the Hitachi copper mine, which itself was one of the greatest copper mines in modern Japan, it is of great value in industrial history. It is also the oldest power plant facility made of reinforced concrete. 5) The surveyed water reservoir (Photo 24) is one of 10 At the time of the survey, the Water Reservoir of the First Ishioka Hydroelectric Power Plant had been destroyed and had collapsed with the ridge (Photo 25). Also, with the outflow of water from the reservoir due to the collapse, an outflow of earth and sand was caused on the hillside, which used to be a forest. Earth and sand accumulated in the rice paddies downstream.
According to an interview with the administrators, developments from the time of the main earthquake at 14:46 on March 11, 2011 (Heisei 23 rd ) to the collapse are shown in Table 12 .
It is thought that the collapse of the reservoir and ridge occurred because of the main earthquake and its aftershocks on March 11th. However, 19:00 is presumed to be the time of the reservoir collapse because that was when residents downstream heard a roaring noise like the sound of a river rushing, but there were no aftershocks bigger than M6 around that time. (Aftershocks bigger than M6 occurred at 17:40 and 20:36.) Furthermore, at 18:00 there was no abnormal water level alarm and so it is assumed that the collapse of the reservoir did not occur at that point.
On the other hand, looking at a photograph of the reservoir taken immediately after the disaster (Photo 26), a crack can be seen in the foundation ground at the corner of the reservoir, on the slope side where the ridge collapsed and the reservoir was built. (The emergency repairs had been carried out at the time of the survey.) Also, the side opposite the collapsed slope had a spillway, but the collapsed slope side did not have it and the reservoir was attached directly to the slope. Considering the conditions described above, the collapse of the reservoir and ridge are presumed to have proceeded as follows:
• The main earthquake at 14:46 swelled the vibrations in the ridge topography and because of this, the foundation ground around the reservoir cracked and part of the foundation ground collapsed.
• Due to the aftershocks, sloshing occurred in the reservoir that is estimated to have been full, and water from the reservoir soaked into the cracks on the slope side, which was without an overflow channel.
• With the supply of water, the crack gradually enlarged and reached the foundation ground of the reservoir floor.
• Due to the crack developing in the foundation ground, the reservoir became like a cantilever and, unable to bear the weight of the full tank, collapsed at about 19:00, four hours after the main earthquake.
• The water stored in the reservoir flowed along the mountain torrent on the hillside to the lower stream along with earth and sand. It is supposed that the reason for the delay in the reservoir collapse from the time of the earthquake was that the foundation ground was, to a certain extent, strong and it took some time for it to collapse despite the water supply to the crack by repeated inundation due to the aftershocks.
b) Status of emergency restoration work
According to the administrators, emergency repairs were made immediately after the disaster as a restoration of the power supply was requested in anticipation of a power shortage in the summer.
For these repairs, the collapsed slope was temporarily protected by spraying concrete and a new reservoir was built upstream of the existing reservoir as it was expected that the construction of countermeasures against the collapse of the bottom floor of the reservoir would take a long time. As a result, the construction was completed by the 26 th of June, three months after the disaster, and the First Ishioka Hydroelectric Power Plant was back in operation on the 29 th of the same month.
At the time of the site survey, the collapsed slope had already undergone emergency repairs with sprayed concrete. Also, the parts of the concrete structure that had made up the reservoir were sealed into the slope by the sprayed concrete in the exact places they ended up in after the collapse and thus they remained on site (Photo 27). c) Challenges and proposals for the full-scale restoration works The collapsed and destroyed reservoir has already been fixed onto the slope by concrete spray and delisted from the Important Cultural Properties (Structure). Therefore, it would be difficult to restore it as a cultural property reservoir in the future, but the installation of at least an explanation board on site or some other way to honor the cultural property is desirable.
Furthermore, although the water reservoir was delisted as a cultural property, the First Ishioka Hydroelectric Power Plant as a whole retains its other cultural properties. The settling basin, the first aqueduct, the second aqueduct, the reservoir spillway, the surging tank, the generator room in the main building, the former transformer gallery in the main building, and the transformer gallery in the main building are all still designated as Important Cultural Properties, and their reinforcement for preservation and various surveys should be carried out.
d) Other considerations
If, prior to spraying the concrete to protect the collapsed slope, the condition of each reservoir component that collapsed had been recorded as it was, it could have been possible to identify the disaster factors more precisely. Moreover, if the disaster factors had been identified, it would have made it possible to identify measures against damage to similar kinds of structures in the future. In short, even in the case of the unavoidable delisting of damaged historic civil engineering structures, it is still necessary to preserve records as much as possible.
On the other hand, quite a few power plant facilities have been designated or registered as historic civil engineering structures in Japan, and among those facilities, a number of facilities, for instance, have reservoirs and channels that have been built on a slope or on top of a ridge. In the future, there are concerns about not only large-scale trench-type earthquakes like the one on March 11, but also inland strong local earthquakes due to active faults, thus the practice of thoroughly checking up on such facilities against disasters as earthquakes will be an important task.
Also it would be an important task to practice risk assessment against natural disasters such as earthquakes, volcano eruptions, storm and flood damage and landslide disasters not only for power plant facilities but also for other historic civil engineering structures built in mountainous or semi-mountainous regions or soft ground areas.
DISCUSSION ABOUT THE CONSER-VATION OF HISTORIC CIVIL EN-GINEERING STRUCTURES IN THE TIME OF DISASTER
As described above, through this research we were able to get an overall picture of disaster damage incurred by historic civil engineering structures due to the Great Tohoku Earthquake. Also, through this research, we were able to learn systematic investigation and implementation when observing damage caused by large-scale natural disasters, typically earthquakes, on historic civil engineering structures, as well as methods and research systems. Moreover, based on the survey results, further considerations for the restoration of each damaged facility are summarized here.
These results lead to the suggestion that when historic civil engineering structures are damaged by a disaster, surveys need to be conducted with a view to conserve the structure as much as possible without losing its historical value. These surveys would provide extremely useful knowledge when adequate treatments, repairs or reinforcement are to be applied. Accordingly, based on these results that provide knowledge for the maintenance of historic civil engineering structures in time of disaster, the authors discuss: (1) the system and method of investigating the damage status of historic civil engineering structures by specialists, and (2) considerations on restoring and disaster prevention of historic civil engineering structures.
(1) The system and method of investigating the damage status of historic civil engineering structures a) Research system Based on the experience in the Tohoku Region Pacific Coast Earthquake, we propose that when investigating the damage situation of historic civil engineering structures caused by large-scale natural disasters-as when the system for this research was developed-it is effective to form the system structure by working under the Committee on Historical Studies in Civil Engineering with a team, or the brain, so to speak, that produces strategic plans for the whole research, (for instance, a Subcommittee), as well as a team to conduct the actual site surveys.
Also, we believe that by forming such a system, securing mobility to call investigative meetings, and flexible surveys corresponding to the damage situation or type of structure of the damaged facilities would be viable even in the time of confusion immediately after a disaster, Based on this research, the following is a summary of considerations when forming a systematic investigation structure.
• Organize teams: a 'brain' to produce a strategic plan for the overall research, (here, temporarily named 'Subcommittee'), and teams to conduct the site surveys for each respective subject facility.
• Considering the importance of mobility for conferences and meetings, the members of the Subcommittee should mainly be Tokyo-based specialists and researchers.
• Especially in cases where the affected area may extend over a large region and the potentially damaged historic civil engineering structures pan out over a wide range of facility types, try to select from the specialists and researchers who are connected to the Committee on Historical Studies in Civil Engineering to cover all fields and call them in as members of the Subcommittee.
• Also when potential damage is assumed to a historic civil engineering structure still in use, a practitioner who knows the site well can also be called in as a member of the Subcommittee.
• Furthermore, to ensure smooth cooperation when conducting site surveys, someone from related organizations or committees such as the Agency for Cultural Affairs or the Nomination Committee could be requested to join in as an observer or a member of the Subcommittee.
• For the actual site survey, taking into account the facility type and damage status of the subject facility and presumed disaster factors, build the research team for each subject facility with help from experts and researchers of civil engineering history and civil engineering heritage, as well as experts and researchers from each respective related area of disaster factors such as structure, foundation ground, hydraulics, and earthquake. Having said this, such knowledge was only obtained as a result of this research. As it was not available at the time of the disaster, it took a long time for us to establish investigation systems, including the establishment of the Subcommittee, and the site survey was conducted eight months after the earthquake. Therefore, at the Ishii Lock for example, difficulties were faced in identifying whether the damage on the historic civil engineering structure was caused by this particular earthquake or not, and that was challenging. Also, repairs had already started at Yoshizo Nakagawa's bust site, Lake Kasumigaura bank facilities, and the First Ishioka Hydroelectric Power Plants, and thus it was too late to give sufficient advice and support on how to repair them while keeping as much historical value as possible, or on keeping records at removal and so on.
Based on such experiences, we believe that, in the future, the quick formation of a research team at the time of a disaster and smooth operation of the site survey is desirable. Also, to aid in the quick organizing of an investigation system, it is useful to establish a list or bank of specialists and talented people who may help in the research. Ensuring a system of cooperation with related committees and organizations would also be important.
b) Survey method
As seen in this earthquake disaster, if the affected area extends over a large region and damage in a wide range of civil engineering structures is predicted, it could well be difficult to confirm the existence or absence of damage to historic civil engineering structures at an early stage after the disaster. In that case, we think, as seen in the two survey methods used in this research, a primary survey in written form to check the existence of damage and a secondary survey by site visit to focus on damaged facilities are thought to be effective from the following aspects:
• It is not realistic to secure a sufficient number of surveyors for large-scale investigations related to historic civil engineering structures right after the occurrence of a disaster. Operations will need to correspond to the available human resources, thus a narrowing down of research subjects at some level prior to planning the site survey will be necessary.
• As for the implementation of the site survey, the cooperation of the national or local public bodies is a must (in short, it is difficult for the committee to undertake this on its own). However, immediately after a disaster, those administrations are busy mainly with the restoration of infrastructure, thus consideration is required to not put too much of a burden on them. Again, based on this research, the idea of dividing surveys into two stages is summarized below.
• The primary survey is for subjects that have been valued to a certain extent as 'Important Cultural Properties (structure),' 'Registered Tangible Cultural Properties (structure)' or 'JSCE's Recommended Civil Engineering Heritage.' However, if the affected area is limited to some degree, historic civil engineering structures featured in 'Modern Civil Engineering Heritage of Japan -A Selection of 2800 Existing Important Civil Engineering Structures 7) ' can be included in the research subject. Even if a damaged civil engineering structure is not initially included in this survey, if, in the process of the survey it is admitted to being of some historical value, it can be added to the survey.
• The primary survey is to contact administrators by letter, telephone or e-mail about the existence or absence of damage.
• As for the 'Important Cultural Properties (structure)' and 'Registered Tangible Cultural Properties (structure)' in the primary survey, the Agency for Cultural Affairs would contact the respective local Boards of Education in the local governments about the existence or absence of damage in accordance with the provisions of the Cultural Property Protection Law. On the other hand, any damage to the 'JSCE's Recommended Civil Engineering Heritage' is to be checked for by each region's JSCE branch in cooperation with the Nomination Committee.
• The secondary survey is a site survey on the damage status.
• The subjects of the secondary survey are based on the results of the first survey and they are narrowed down by the aspects listed below; priority is based on the level of damage and the survey starts from the high-priority facilities.
-A facility that was reported as being damaged in the primary survey. -A facility that, considering its location, might need investigation despite being reported as undamaged in the primary survey (damage suspected).
-Facilities where the administrator, local Board of Education or others are unable to check the damage status.
• Research items for the primary and secondary survey are in line with the items shown in Table 4 and Table 7 . We believe that in order to conduct surveys efficiently and effectively, it is important that during 'normal times,' basic information such as specifications, drawings and photos as well as various related research reports about civil engineering heritage that are regarded as having some value, and designated, registered or recommended civil engineering heritage, be kept as records. Also an accessible database system must be built, which can be continuously used and added to. During this research, prior to the implementation of the survey, there was not enough basic information available; thus it was difficult to identify what part of a research subject facility was historically valuable or where to concentrate on at the site survey in order to compare values and so on. Also, it was difficult to determine whether the damage seen in the subject facilities came from this particular earthquake, or from aging before the earthquake disaster or otherwise.
Also, we conceive that, in the future, there is a need to build up a systematic database of historic civil engineering structures for continuous use and additions by, for instance, making use of the archive site of the JSCE.
(2) Considerations concerning disaster prevention and restoration of historic civil engineering structures Through this research, we were able to understand the damage caused to historic civil engineering structures affected by the Great East Japan Earthquake, as well as estimate their damage factors (Table 13) . We consider that this accumulation of details concerning the damage status and factors, and the related specific examples indicates some very important aspects for future disaster prevention for the historic civil engineering structures, especially risk assessment and management. 8) For example, in this earthquake disaster, with regard to the historic civil engineering structures, damage from subsidence and liquefaction was just as great as direct damage from the tsunami and seismic motion as seen in the Ishii Lock, Yokotone Lock or the Lake Kasumigaura bank facilities. To prepare for such disasters, measures need to be taken by undertaking repairs or reinforcement of the facilities themselves and stabilization of the foundation ground Table 13 The main damage as well as presumed disaster factors of the secondary research subject facilities.
the disaster as a form of opportunity, and when repairing, restoring or reinforcing structures, to use it as a chance to evaluate or check for historical value, which was previously unknown. Also, as seen in the Water Reservoir of the First Ishioka Hydroelectric Power Plant and Yoshizo Nakagawa's bust site, even when removing damaged historic civil engineering structures for unavoidable reasons, in the future it is likely beneficial for purposes of finding new historic values, taking measures for disaster prevention for similar facilities, and identifying the disaster factors to record structures through drawings, photographs, filming and so on prior to removal. In short, we think that even in the case of having to unavoidably remove damaged historic civil engineering structures, it is very important to make as many records as possible of the subject facilities.
In the case of scientific research or analysis to the damaged historic civil engineering structuresfor example, the causal relationship between the damage factors and condition-building up an empirical database for evaluating the efficiency of the styles and materials used for the historic civil engineering structures is recommended. We consider that such a database of the materials and styles of the historic civil engineering structures would be useful when planning disaster prevention for the subject facilities and evaluating efficiency. 9) Based on this research and analysis, by evaluating disaster prevention functions of the historic civil engineering structures, we conceive that discussion on cooperation for the surrounding area's local disaster prevention plans is possible.
CONCLUSION
This paper can be summarized as follows: First, the authors summarized the whole survey process, such as consultation and construction of the system of the damage survey on historic civil engineering structures, which led to the forming of the Special Subcommittee on the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake under the Committee on Historical Studies in Civil Engineering, establishment of the survey methods, and implementation of the survey. In addition, the authors indicated important points in establishing a research system and survey methods for grasping the status of historic civil engineering structures damaged by the earthquake. On top of that, the authors synthesized the status of damage of each historic civil engineering structure caused by the Great Tohoku Earthquake, and also discussed the disaster factors, and challenges and proposals for future fullscale restoration work.
Furthermore, based on those results, the authors suggested: i) a system and research methods for investigating the damage status of historic civil engineering structures by specialists, and ii) considerations for disaster restoration and prevention for historic civil engineering structures.
These results should exhibit extremely beneficial knowledge towards the conservation of historic civil engineering structures at the time of a disaster.
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